6.
(b)
(iv)
(v)
adopted, the Naval forces available for the defence would only have a limited scope for action by sea. Some of their personnel could probably be used for manning additional guns, at present available from Naval resources, or spare movable guns, for the further strengthening of the land defence, partic- ularly on the South of the Island, or to form additional machine gun units, for which sufficient guns are already available at Hon kong.
Good lateral communications existá all round the Island, and would facilitate the movement of troops to threatened points.
Supplies of all kinds are to be found on the Island in quantities sufficient for a long defence.
On the other hand the question of the disposal of hundreds of thousands of Chinese who live on the Island, would be one of difficulty.
Their expulsion, while there was yet time, could only be carried out by the most drastic measures, while their retention during the attack on the Island would seriously embarrass, and possibly bring about the collapse of the defence.
On the whole, however, it appears that the best method of employing the forces which can at present be made available for the Defence of Hongkong, would be to adopt the course outlined in paragraph 4 (c),i.e. to concentrate on the defence of the Island of Hongkong.
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Private notes are available after approval.